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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
  
 
The international community undertakes considerable efforts to eradicate the scourge of 
child soldiering. Mostly, though, these efforts replay the same narratives and circulate the same 
assumptions.  
 
This book takes a second look at these efforts. It aspires to refresh law and policy so as to 
improve preventative, restorative, and remedial initiatives while also vivifying the dignity of 
youth. Along the way, this book also questions central tenets of contemporary humanitarianism, 
rethinks elements of international criminal justice, and hopes to embolden the rights of the child. 
 
The organizational framework is straightforward. Chapter 1 broaches the issues, sets out 
dominant assumptions, and provides a quick overview of the central arguments. Chapters 2 and 3 
introduce a diversity of accounts of the realities of child soldiering that, to date, have been 
inadequately considered by international lawyers and policymakers. These Chapters are 
descriptive in that they present these accounts. They also are synthetic in that they interpretively 
distil common themes and, thereby, build a composite. These Chapters also are analytic in that 
they lay a foundation for the normative arguments that ensue. Chapters 4 and 5 transition the 
book to international law and policy. These Chapters respectively address two themes: first, 
accountability of child soldiers and, second, accountability for child soldiering. These Chapters 
examine law and policy as they are and, much more importantly, the direction in which both are 
heading. Chapters 6 and 7 then suggest a variety of reforms to the content and trajectory of law 
and policy in light of the complex realities of child soldiering. International lawyers and 
policymakers are predisposed to dissemble these complexities. Although understandable, this 
penchant ultimately is counterproductive.  
 
This book extensively discusses research conducted and published by a broad range of 
scholars and practitioners, who pursue diverse methodologies, including surveys, participant 
observation, and qualitative studies. Extensive citations supplement this book‟s discussion of this 
vivid body of research. This means that some sections of this book are heavily footnoted. My 
purpose is for this discussion to assist readers by serving a compilation and reference function. 
As an international lawyer with an interest in political transitions from episodes of systematic 
human rights abuses, I draw from this research, which originates outside of the legal academy, to 
interrogate the content of law and policy. On the one hand, the fact that this book draws from and 
synthesizes the work of others can be taken to be a limitation. Readers will not find in these 
pages new on-the-ground data that I personally have collected or heterodox experiences that I 
personally have encountered. On the other hand, this approach offers considerable advantages. It 
permits this book to transcend the micro and energize a discussion at a cross-national, 
interdisciplinary, and “big picture” panoptic level. Pivoting off this “big picture,” this book urges 
reform through a dynamic process of critique and renewal. It aims to build upon and enhance the 
efforts of global civil society, international lawmakers, and UN agencies. 
 
So many people have helped and inspired me. I thank Kokouvi Luc Dodzi Akakpo, 
Cécile Aptel, Robert John Araujo, Ronald Atkinson, Olympia Bekou, Susan Benesch, Johanna 
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Bond, Christopher Bruner, Naomi Cahn, Cynthia Chamberlain, Roxana Cimpeanu, Nancy 
Combs, David Crane, Rob Cryer, Beth Dougherty, Susan Franck, Steven Freeland, Ken Gallant, 
Tom Ginsburg, Larry Helfer, Linda Keller, Rick Kirgis, Tim Jost, Dan Joyner, Brandon Kohrt, 
Erik Luna, Tim MacDonnell, Larry May, Nesam Mcmillan, Jens Meierhenrich, Martin 
Mennecke, Russ Miller, David Millon, Sarah Nouwen, Mark Osiel, Di Otto, Kim Lane 
Scheppele, Rob Sloane, Chris Slobogin, Alette Smeulers, Barry Sullivan, Scott Sundby, Immi 
Tallgren, Tim Waters, Harvey Weinstein, Mike Wessells, Bert Westbrook, and three anonymous 
reviewers for instructive comments and encouragement. I am very appreciative to John Louth 
and Merel Alstein at OUP for the enthusiasm and thought they have invested in this project.  
 
This book grew from workshops held at a variety of universities, including Alabama, 
Arkansas, the Australian National University, Bond, Cornell, Georgia, Loyola-Chicago, McGill, 
Melbourne, Monash, Ottawa, Queen‟s, Sydney, Vanderbilt, the VU Amsterdam, Washington and 
Lee, Windsor, and Yale. Participants in each of these workshops provided invaluable feedback. I 
also appreciate comments generated at two sessions of the International Studies Association 
Annual Meetings in New York and Montréal, as well as the University of South Carolina‟s 
Conference on Rebuilding Sierra Leone.  
 
This book would not have been possible without the unflagging support of my home 
institution, Washington and Lee University, and the wonderful people with whom I have the 
privilege of working. Linda Newell unflappably tracked down more sources than I ever could 
count. Diane Cochran delivered critical administrative and moral support. Through the 
generosity of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Michael Baudinet, Joanna Heiberg, Lisa Markman, 
Christine Shepard, and Scott Weingart were able to provide absolutely stellar editing and 
research assistance. They went well beyond the call of duty with aplomb, inventiveness, and 
determination. I also thank Pakapon Phinyowattanachip, Mark Sullivan, and Christopher Zona 
for their hard work. Any errors in the text are my own. 
 
Much of this book was written in Australia while I was on sabbatical leave in 2010. 
During this precious time, I had the joy of being Visiting Scholar and Senior Fellow at the 
University of Melbourne, School of Law; Parsons Visitor at the University of Sydney, School of 
Law; and Visiting Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics on the 
campus of the Australian National University in Canberra. Without the inspiration and friendship 
of Kevin Jon Heller, this visit would not have happened. I remain deeply in his debt. In addition, 
Tom Campbell, Hilary Charlesworth, Mark Findlay, David Kinley, Larry May, and Gerry 
Simpson – among many others – deserve great thanks for their kindness in hosting me, and my 
family, for such a wonderful experience. 
 
Nothing in my life would ever be possible without the patience, support, joy, laughter, 
and grace of my beautiful wife Michelle and our delightfully inspiring sons Paul and Luke. I owe 
so much to them. I also thank my parents. They always are there for me, and now us, like 
sunshine. 
 
Scattered parts of Chapters 3 and 5 herein are materially updated, with permission, from 
my essay Child Soldiers: Agency, Enlistment, and the Collectivization of Innocence, in 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
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APPROACH 207-231 (Alette Smeulers, ed., Intersentia, 2010). Adaptations reflect the evolution of 
my thoughts, emergence of new research, and recent developments. Seven short paragraphs in 
Chapter 7(i) herein are adapted from discussion at pages 187-194 of my first book, ATROCITY, 
PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2007).   
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AFRC   Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
AUC   Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
CAR   Central African Republic 
CDF   Civil Defence Forces 
CRC   Convention on the Rights of the Child 
DDR   Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
DRC   Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECCC    Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
ELN   Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
FARC   Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
FNI    Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes 
FPLC    Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo 
FRELIMO  Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) 
FRPI    Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICTR   International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IDDRS  Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards 
IMT   International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 
LRA   Lord‟s Resistance Army 
LTTE   Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
NGOs   Non-governmental organizations 
NPFL    National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
OTP    Office of the Prosecutor (ICC) 
RENAMO  Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) 
RPA   Rwandese Patriotic Army 
RUF   Revolutionary United Front 
SCSL   Special Court for Sierra Leone 
SLA   Sierra Leonean Army 
STL    Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
SWAY  Survey for War Affected Youth 
TRC    Truth and reconciliation commission 
UN   United Nations 
UNICEF  United Nations Children‟s Fund 
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola) 
UNTAET  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
UPC    Union des patriotes congolais 
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Chapter 1 
 
COMING OF AGE IN ATROCITY 
 
 
It is easy to see the child soldier superficially as a contradiction in terms or simply as an 
anachronism. Neither childhood nor youth, after all, should be about war or weapons. 
Nonetheless – and however jarring – militarization suffuses the lives of many children.  
 
At the very least, world-wide, tens of thousands of persons below the age of eighteen 
currently are associated with armed forces or armed groups. Adults who serve in such forces or 
groups, moreover, may have joined while younger than eighteen. In addition, the past decade has 
seen the demobilization of many tens of thousands more child soldiers. Although joyful, their 
return journey to civilian life also is bittersweet. They come back home to the communities 
where they initially had been recruited – at times, forcibly – and where, in some instances, they 
had committed terrible atrocities. While associated with armed forces or groups, many child 
recruits are subject to brutalities, beatings, and rape. Drug and alcohol abuse is common. 
 
International law and policy cover considerable ground in their efforts to eradicate child 
soldiering and promote the well-being of current and former child soldiers. States adopt treaties 
and instruments, while also endorsing principles and declarations. Experts issue reports. 
Organizations draft best practices and “how to” guidelines. Authorities prepare model 
interventions. Conscripting, enlisting, or using younger children – namely, under the age of 
fifteen – in hostilities is an international war crime for which adult commanders recently have 
been convicted. Additional verdicts are imminent, including against Charles Taylor, Liberia‟s 
former dictator.  
 
Although international interventions have helped reduce specific incidents, the practice of 
child soldiering still persists. It may shift locally, and abate here and there, but it endures 
globally. Preventative measures, therefore, remain inadequate. Former child soldiers experience 
challenges in readjusting to civilian life. Reintegration is complex and eventful. The 
homecoming is only the beginning. Reconciliation within communities afflicted by violence 
committed by and against child soldiers is incomplete. Shortfalls linger on the restorative front. 
 
What, then, to do? The reflexive response among international lawyers and transnational 
policymakers is to hone familiar tools and work them even faster. In practice, this means that 
humanitarian efforts ramp up the chorus of outrage regarding the plight of child soldiers. These 
efforts typically highlight themes of vulnerability, frailty, victimization, and incapacity.  
 
The reflexive response is full of good intentions. It is rhetorically compelling. But it is 
becoming palliative. This book urges lawmakers and policymakers to transcend what passes as 
conventional wisdom. It encourages them to peer beyond into a more demanding space. The time 
is right for something new.  
 
Meaningful reform, however, first requires the international community to reimagine 
child soldiers and the sources of child soldiering. This reimaginative exercise, in turn, calls into 
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question habits and expectations that pervade contemporary humanitarianism, the universality of 
human rights, strategies for juvenile civic engagement, and post-conflict justice. Lessons learned 
from recent experiences with child soldiering and the improvements that can be made on this 
front, therefore, weave into a much broader revisionist tapestry.  
  
This book raises a number of admittedly tough questions. Are child soldiers necessarily 
well-served by formulaic stereotypes that no child ever can volunteer to participate in armed 
forces or groups? That all child soldiers are used and none wish to engage in martial activities? 
That no person under the age of eighteen can commit human rights abuses for reasons other than 
being cruelly forced to do so? That all conflicts that implicate children are innately senseless? 
That children associated with armed forces or groups see themselves as victims? As misled? The 
way international activists conceptualize an issue may morph into a self-fulfilling prophecy that, 
in turn, fails to concretize optimal programmatic interventions for the intended beneficiaries. 
 
Remedial efforts currently undertaken for former child soldiers accentuate medicalized 
trauma recovery and psychotherapy. Although taken as obvious, is this emphasis the best way 
forward? Perhaps readers may be happily surprised to learn that the mental health of former child 
soldiers may be less precarious and more robust than commonly believed. Hence, programmatic 
interventions ought to include more in the way of economic, educational, justice, and 
occupational efforts. Readers also may be surprised to learn that many child soldiers exit fighting 
factions not by way of humanitarian rescue but, rather, entirely on their own by dint of personal 
initiative. They escape. Or they abandon the armed force or group once they tire of militarized 
life or begin to see the futility in the putative cause for which they are fighting. In short, rescue is 
less common than conventional wisdom may suppose, while escape is more common. 
 
How to effectively sanction commanders who conscript, enlist, or use children in 
hostilities? For the moment, entities that finance, fund, or arm groups and forces that deploy 
children largely fall below the radar screen. How can this blind spot be addressed? Some child 
soldiers are implicated in grievous acts of atrocity. Should transitional justice mechanisms be 
considered for them? For reasons this book sets out, criminal trials are ill-fitting in this regard. 
But is there not room to be more creative about engineering justice such that it involves more 
than just courtrooms and jailhouses? In the case of child soldiers, it is not axiomatically wise to 
eschew accountability conversations. Accountability measures other than criminal trials – such 
as truth commissions and traditional ceremonies – may facilitate reintegration, rehabilitation, 
restoration, and reparation. In the long-term, shielding juveniles them from law‟s obligations 
while conferring upon them law‟s beneficent protectiveness might not durably anchor them as 
rights-bearers.  
 
If some children join armed forces or groups for social, economic, or political reasons, 
does treating them as passive or incompetent address their grievances? Is it helpful to downplay 
how the child entered militarized life, whether by abduction, voluntary enlistment, or because he 
or she was born into the armed group? Are policies that eliminate distinctions among the roles 
that child soldiers perform during conflict necessarily wise? At present, girl soldiers are 
consistently underserved by post-conflict programming. So, too, are children who are born into 
armed groups. What about the many children – and adults – who did not associate with armed 
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groups but were aggrieved by the conduct of children who did? What does justice mean for 
them?  
 
However embedded, perceptions of the victim status of child soldiers remain somewhat 
contingent upon the nationality of those persons injured by their conduct. Child soldiers who 
commit violence – for example, terrorist attacks – against Western targets are seen less like 
deluded children and more like menacing adults. On a related note, how does the West treat child 
soldiers affiliated with armed factions who, following their decommissioning, may seek refugee 
status within its borders? What actions by Western states may abet child soldiering? Rebel 
elements in Libya currently engaging Muammar Kaddafi‟s armed forces enlist children, who 
have come forth on their own to volunteer. NATO bombs Libya in an attempt to oust Kaddafi 
from above. Little consternation is expressed regarding the child recruits trying to do the same 
from below. As this book unpacks, law and policy do not always apply consistently. Their 
forward trajectory may ebb and flow depending on state power and politics. 
 
 
(i)  Defining the Terms 
 
Who, exactly, is a child soldier? A standardized – and increasingly legalized – definition 
has emerged, in large part through two major international conferences. The first, which was 
held in Cape Town in 1997, focused on the demobilization and social reintegration of child 
soldiers in Africa. A follow-up conference was convened in Paris in 2007. Co-hosted by the 
United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) and the French government, this event was of a 
larger scale and global orientation. It included representatives of fifty-eight states along with 
many key stakeholders.  
 
The Cape Town and Paris conferences each led to the adoption of non-binding 
instruments that have since obtained widespread professional, operational, and political currency. 
The initial development and subsequent circulation of these influential instruments owes much to 
the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies, 
donors, and activists. This constellation of actors also has sensitized a global public through 
media outreach, film, and literature.  
 
These instruments include as child soldiers much more than only those persons younger 
than eighteen who carry weapons, engage in combat, or who take (or have taken) a direct part in 
hostilities. Also included are children used for auxiliary activities (for example, portering, 
spying, and cooking) and children forced into sexual servitude. The impetus among 
policymakers is to discourage distinctions from being drawn between children who serve as 
combatants and children who do not or who do so only incidentally. One motivation in this 
regard is to ensure inclusiveness toward both girl and boy soldiers. Accordingly, and 
responsively, official nomenclature has drifted away from child soldier as initially set out and 
defined in the Cape Town Principles.
1
 The move is now toward the somewhat tongue-tying 
children associated with armed forces or armed groups, defined in the Paris Principles to cover: 
                                                 
1
 Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (Apr. 27-30, 1997) (definitions), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf (a child soldier is “any person under 18 years of 
age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not 
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Any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or 
used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not 
limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, 
messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child 
who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.
2
  
 
Whereas armed forces refer to official state militaries, armed groups refer to non-state entities 
distinct from those forces (notably, rebel or protest movements, dissident factions, and 
insurgents).  
 
Notwithstanding some differences between the Cape Town and Paris definitions, both 
still share considerable textual overlap regarding the actual persons they protect. Experts often 
become ensnared in debates over terms and titles.
3
 Terminology matters, to be sure, but debates 
over it may devolve into distractions. For reasons of convenience and brevity, this book 
primarily uses the term child soldiers, but understands its definitional scope as based on the 2007 
Paris Principles. This book understands the determination of who is considered a child soldier to 
arise not at the point of exit from militarized life, but at the point of entry. Hence, a former child 
soldier is a person who was initially associated with armed forces or armed groups while under 
the age of eighteen, even if he or she is eighteen or older at the time of release, demobilization, 
escape, or rescue.  
 
At its very core, settled international law makes it unlawful to recruit or use anyone under 
the age of fifteen in armed forces or armed groups. Actors and activists push to discard fifteen 
and replace it across-the-board with eighteen.
4
 This push actuates the “Straight 18” advocacy 
position. As this book sets out, international law has absorbed many of the aspirations of the 
Straight 18 position. Armed groups, for example, are barred from recruiting anyone younger than 
eighteen. International law treats state armed forces more ambiguously. This means that 
international law has not yet absorbed every aspiration of the Straight 18 position. However, 
international law‟s trend-line arcs toward the Straight 18 horizon. Accordingly, much of settled 
law has become dated, if not stale, and is becoming increasingly so. The Straight 18 position has 
considerable momentum and portends what will be. Its advocacy efforts, furthermore, have 
exercised even greater influence in shaping transnational policy initiatives, best practices, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members;” and 
explicitly including girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage; and affirming that the definition “does 
not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms”) [hereinafter Cape Town Principles].  
2
 The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Feb. 
2007), prin. 2.1, available at www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/Paris_Principles_March_2007.pdf [hereinafter 
Paris Principles]. As of September 2010, ninety-five states have endorsed the Paris Commitments, which the Paris 
Principles accompany.  
3
 Yet another term of art circulated by experts is “children associated with fighting forces.”  
4
 For example, UNICEF “joins other organizations, child rights advocates and NGOs in advocating a „straight 18 
ban‟ on all recruitment, compulsory or voluntary and participation of children under 18 in hostilities.” UNICEF, 
ADULT WARS, CHILD SOLDIERS: VOICES OF CHILDREN INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE EAST ASIA AND 
PACIFIC REGION 12 (2002); see also Human Rights Watch, SOLD TO BE SOLDIERS: THE RECRUITMENT AND USE OF 
CHILD SOLDIERS IN BURMA 14 (2007) (calling on the Burmese government to cease recruiting and to demobilize 
children younger than eighteen from armed forces, and also to “[d]evelop and impose effective and appropriate 
sanctions against individuals found to be recruiting children under 18 into the armed forces”).  
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persuasive authority such as the commitments and principles emerging from the Cape Town and 
Paris processes.
5
  
 
As recently as 2008, it was estimated that military recruitment of children and their use in 
hostilities “still takes place in one form or another in at least 86 countries and territories 
worldwide.”6 Accordingly, this book considers evidence from an array of jurisdictions. Although 
many child soldiers are found within the ranks of armed groups, state actors also incorporate 
children into armed forces. Burma (Myanmar) is presently the largest state recruiter of child 
soldiers. Subject to a variety of conditions, persons under the age of eighteen may voluntarily 
enlist in armed forces and reserves in a number of countries, albeit a minority overall, including 
Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Germany, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. In addition, this book examines recent and ongoing evidence of child 
soldiering in both armed forces and armed groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nepal, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, and Uganda.  
 
The focus of this book tilts towards the involvement of child soldiers in atrocity-
producing conflicts, particularly conflicts in which international courts and tribunals indict (and, 
in some instances, are able to prosecute and punish) alleged offenders. Several recent conflicts 
that have become internationally judicialized situate in Africa, to wit, the DRC, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Sudan, and Sierra Leone. A number of these jurisdictions, moreover, have undertaken 
ambitious programmatic initiatives to reintegrate former child soldiers. So, too, have some 
jurisdictions whose atrocity-producing conflicts have not formally become subject to 
international judicialization efforts. Liberia is a case-in-point. Consequently, this book is more 
about child soldiering in African states than it is about child soldiering elsewhere. In this regard, 
this book entwines with my own experiences with international justice which also, starting with 
my legal work in Rwanda over a decade ago, center on Africa. Persons who were minors at the 
time of allegedly committing acts of genocide were among the suspects I assisted in the Kigali 
prison. My choice to focus on child soldiers in Africa is not intended to dilute the reality that 
child soldiering truly is a global phenomenon. To be clear, only a plurality – reportedly, about 
40% – of the global number of child soldiers is located on the African continent. When 
responding to Africa, transnational narratives often sensationalize and objectify through 
intemperate depictions, distorted lenses, and paternalistic hues.
7
 My aim is to transcend these 
                                                 
5
 The term “best practices” (also, “good practices”) initially arose within corporate planning and has now entered the 
lexicon of domestic and international administrative law. Best practices are not formally binding rules. They refer to 
consensually agreed upon regulatory measures and processes, often informal in nature, that over time crystallize into 
preferential models. Because of their iterated use and replication, best practices acquire a quasi-legal character. 
6
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008 12 (2008). 
7
 Referencing the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA), a notorious rebel group in Northern Uganda, Ben Mergelsberg 
notes: “The narrative of the LRA abducting young, innocent children, brainwashing them and forcing them to fight 
is common in the media. It evokes a generalized image of the child soldier as a vulnerable innocent without any 
agency, brutally abducted, drugged and turned into a monster.” Ben Mergelsberg, Between two worlds: former LRA 
soldiers in northern Uganda, in THE LORD‟S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY 156, 156 (Tim Allen & Koen 
Vlassenroot eds., 2010). Mergelsberg, however, adds that: “[T]he view of helpless children without agency in what 
has happened to them often does not correspond to their actual experiences. Passive victims on first sight, they 
turned out during my fieldwork to be active survivors with a good sense of why they were fighting, how they 
survived and what they needed most after their return.” Id. at 156-157.  
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pernicious impulses and the half-truths that emerge from them; and to resist tiresome tendencies 
that Africanize a global phenomenon and pathologize African conflicts.  
 
More boys than girls are represented in the subgroup of child soldiers who commit acts of 
atrocity. One of my goals is to emphasize that these children can return to civilian life and can 
integrate within the community. Consequently, this book comes to talk more about boy soldiers 
than it does about girl soldiers. This book does incorporate considerable data regarding girl 
soldiers, however, whose roles in communal violence are considerably more complex than may 
prosaically be assumed. Moreover, my recommended policy reforms would diversify post-
conflict programming. They would accord greater centrality to initiatives specific to girl soldiers 
and implement a gender-sensitive approach. 
 
In what remains of this first Chapter, I introduce core concepts and evidence. I also 
foreshadow the book‟s trajectory.  
 
 
 (ii)  Images of Child Soldiers 
 
Transnational discourse typifies child soldiers in a variety of images. These portraits 
communicate easily with the public, but Myriam Denov is right to point out that they also 
inordinately simplify the complex lives and experiences of child soldiers.
8
 In this regard, I would 
add, these images may even dehumanize their subjects. 
 
One image is that of a very young child – a guileless naïf – hued as clueless and 
dependent. This image telescopes the child soldier as a helpless object manipulated locally by 
adult malevolence, yet at the same time to be rescued transnationally by adult humanitarianism. 
It portrays child soldiers as forced into service, forced to fight, and forced to kill. Its visuals are 
of crazed militias that steal children from their families and tear them from their communities.
 
In 
the hands of such militias, these children become neutered mechanical means used to fulfill 
nefarious ends over which they have no input. They are no more than “instruments of war” and 
“the weapon of choice.”9 In another influential account, that of distinguished human rights 
activist Roméo Dallaire, child soldiers are portrayed as an “end-to-end weapon system” and as 
“tools;” what is more, children “are vulnerable and easy to catch, just like minnows in a pond,” 
with the involved adults depicted as “evil.”10 This image melds with and, in turn, disseminates a 
narrative – now transposed into law and policy – through which child soldiers are construed first 
and foremost as victims. In terms of on-the-ground practice, however, the conceptual 
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understanding of child soldiers principally as victims tends towards operational interventions that 
essentialize their victimhood. This first image, therefore, typifies the child soldier as a faultless 
passive victim.  
 
A second image, which harmonizes with the victim narrative, is that of child soldiers as 
irreparable damaged goods. Pursuant to this image, child soldiers are tormented and scarred. 
They form part of a “lost generation.”11 This image captures the pain of militarized life and the 
concomitant physical and emotional injuries. Yet it does so at the cost of overlooking the 
resilience of former child soldiers and children in war zones generally. This depiction defines 
expectations and sets parameters. Constructions of the child soldier as psychologically 
devastated and pilfered by conflict, for example, have spurred the preeminence of trauma 
recovery models in post-conflict programming. 
 
A third image – somewhat antiquated, yet still in circulation – posits the child soldier as a 
hero, whose valor flows from fighting for a just cause that resists oppression or demonstrating 
patriotism.
12
 In contradistinction to the faultless passive victim image, the hero image plays up 
the independence, conviction, nobility, and enterprise of the child soldier. This portrayal also 
may venerate military service, however, and play into pernicious norms of masculinity and 
hyper-aggression. It can lead to a parlous situation for the unpopular side. In Timor-Leste, for 
example, “children who fought on the side of independence were considered heroes [while] 
[t]hose who fought on the opposing side were stigmatized, and some were later targeted.”13 
 
A final image dramatically appears in journalistic accounts, political grandstanding, and 
national security circles. This image stylizes the child soldier as demon and bandit: irredeemable, 
baleful, and sinister. Pursuant to this depiction, the child soldier is a ticking time-bomb, bad seed, 
and warped soul incorrigibly determined to kill with alacrity.
14
 This flawed image comports with 
two alarming policy outputs. The first is the pointlessness of investing in the rehabilitation of 
former child soldiers. The second is the neglect of girl soldiers. The demon and bandit image, 
after all, tends to present child soldiers as wild boys, which clouds the reality that “[a]s many as 
40 percent of child soldiers may be girls.”15 Girl soldiers already are poorly served by extant 
programming that under-appreciates the specific gender-based reintegrative challenges they face. 
The demon image piles onto these challenges. Gender-based aspects involve abhorrent sexual 
violence and forced marriage. Many girls give birth while associated with armed forces or 
groups. Rates of HIV, AIDS, and sexually transmitted diseases are high. Upon cessation of 
hostilities, it is not uncommon for local communities to marginalize these young mothers and 
                                                 
11
 P.W. Singer, CHILDREN AT WAR 38, 44 (2005).  
12
 Denov, supra note 8, at 9-10 (noting also the celebrity status of some high-profile child soldiers viewed as 
heroically transcending from violence to redemption).  
13
 UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in cooperation with the International Center for Transitional Justice, 
CHILDREN AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS 47 (2010) (citation omitted) [hereinafter CHILDREN AND TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS].  
14
 Denov, supra note 8, at 6; see also Christopher Blattman & Jeannie Annan, The Consequences of Child 
Soldiering, 92(4) REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 882, 882 (2010) (reporting on and critiquing the use of 
this imagery); Michael Wessells, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 45 (2006, first paperback 2009) 
(noting that “this portrayal contradicts much evidence and does injustice to the rich interplay between personal and 
situational influences on decisions to become soldiers”). 
15
 Wessells, CHILD SOLDIERS, supra note 14, at 9 (citing to a 2005 Save the Children Report). 
18 
 
view their children with repugnance. Insofar as the fathers of these children (at times themselves 
teenagers) may have been abusive fighters and unit commanders, the “bad seed” may be 
perceived by communities as passing down intergenerationally. Girl soldiers, assuredly, are not 
an indiscriminate group of interchangeable members. Girls who become “wives” of commanders 
exert power over girls without “husbands.” This latter group, in turn, comes to suffer even 
greater levels of sexual abuse. Some girls commit terrible acts of atrocity against other girls, 
boys, women, and men. The demon and bandit image also obscures the fact that boys, too, are 
sexually abused. 
 
These four images are not equals. Hierarchy and ordinality can be theorized among them 
with regard to their operational influence in shaping official policies and sculpting conventional 
wisdom.  
 
The faultless passive victim image has achieved widespread traction within – and is 
avidly disseminated by – influential inter-governmental organizations and UN agencies, along 
with NGOs and other actors that populate global civil society.
16
 It has consequently come to 
dominate international discourse. The faultless passive victim image binds communities of 
conscience. Chapter 2 of this book unpacks how this image has ascended as a metaphor for the 
child soldier: continuously defining the child soldier at the point of entry into conflict, during 
conflict, at the point of exit from conflict, and also in the aftermath of conflict. Applied top-down 
in a wide-range of places, this image is portable. It forms part of transnational rule of law 
discourse and technique. Although projections of it by communities of conscience have become 
more refined over time, its core attributes persist and, in fact, are hardening into law and policy. 
This portrait scripts official conversations about child soldiers. Accordingly, these conversations 
become conformist and stilted.  
  
Global civil society, advocacy groups, donors, and activists lack the formal capacity to 
make international law. Although some international and intergovernmental organizations, 
including some UN agencies, may exercise law-making ability, most do not (including many 
whose mandates touch upon child soldiering). By virtue of their activities, however, all of these 
actors shape the content of binding international law as traditionally made by states and, what is 
more, often determine the legally-oriented content of best practices, rule of law blueprints, and 
policy guidelines.
17
 I refer to this normative, aspirational, and operational mix of international 
law, policy, and practice – constituted as it is directly and indirectly by a broad constellation of 
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actors – as the international legal imagination.18 On the topic of child soldiers, the faultless 
passive victim image fills the international legal imagination. This image thereby contributes to 
and influences the substance of international law and policy.  
 
Attending to the scourge of child soldiering has become a portal for transnational rights 
discourse and its broader reformist ambitions to enter local constituencies. In this regard, the 
child soldier has become a site that serves broader political purposes. One purpose is the 
naturalization of certain characteristics of childhood. Another purpose is the universalization of a 
child as anyone below the age of eighteen. This book carefully considers the relationship 
between internationalized legal norms regarding coming of age, which are rooted in chronology, 
and diverse localized understandings, which are more malleably informed by experience, 
activity, relationship, and station in life. 
 
One goal of the faultless passive victim image is to curb punitive policies and harsh 
measures that may flow from the demon caricature. At times, pressure may arise within post-
conflict societies to pursue such policies against former child soldiers. Transnational actors may 
discursively respond to these pressures by even further inflating the unwitting dependency and 
sacrificial nature of militarized youth. In so doing, transnational actors dichotomize 
conversational frames such that child soldiers unhelpfully become either “sinners” or “saints” 
when, in reality, they are neither.
19
  
 
Because the depiction of the demon child soldier tends to hail from the global South 
(notably Africa), it reinforces racial stereotypes. Nor, however, are racial overtones absent from 
the image of the faultless passive victim image. This portrait may inadvertently pathologize 
entire social structures by presenting the children as needing to be saved from their communities, 
from their cultures, and from their families.   
 
Although not the doing of global civil society, the turn to victimhood narratives to thwart 
punitive policies and retributive measures can be selective. Owing to state behavior, the political 
suitability of these narratives correlates to whom, exactly, the conduct of the child soldiers 
aggrieves. A center/periphery divide emerges. As this book unpacks, transnational conceptions 
of faultlessness do not fully reach children from the periphery who commit atrocious acts against 
Westerners. Whereas the child perpetrator targeting Africans tends to be held as a mindless 
captive of purposeless violence, the child perpetrator targeting Westerners tends to be held as an 
intentional author of purposeful violence. 
 
In short, all extreme images of child soldiers run the risk, as Denov eloquently counsels, 
of “reflect[ing] and reproduc[ing] enduring hierarchies between the global North and South, 
cementing notions of race, perversity and barbarism, alongside the dehumanization of child 
soldiers and their societies.”20  
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Within post-conflict societies guided by international judicialization and administration 
efforts, policy initiatives generated by the faultless passive victim imagery presuppose and 
designate local child soldiers as programmed to commit terrible abuses over which they have 
neither appreciation nor control. Child soldiers are seen as forcibly coerced into military service 
and, in the case of atrocity-producing conflicts, compelled to commit horrific human rights 
abuses.
21
 As a group, and ipso facto as individuals, they are taken to lack any volition. Seen as 
“faceless,” they “have not yet developed a concept of justice.”22  
 
Is the projected image fully explanatory? If not, do its deficiencies or omissions matter? 
This book argues that, notwithstanding accuracy in many individual cases, the portrayal of the 
child soldier as a faultless passive victim is unduly reductive. It belies considerably more varied 
actual individual experiences. This image – as do all extreme images of the child soldier – 
occludes, flattens, and conceals details. And, yes, these details are salient. They matter. It is 
inadequate to generalize an overarching understanding of child soldiering based on the more 
extreme cases. Extrapolating from the extremes instead of the mean sensationalizes vulnerability 
and trauma.
23
 A proportionate and inclusive process of inductive reasoning requires even-handed 
consideration of the full gamut of individual experiences, not only a subset of those cases most 
compatible with pre-determined advocacy efforts. Child soldiers and child soldiering are not so 
simple. 
 
In the end, I urge the international legal imagination to adopt a supple, empathetic, and 
dexterous approach to child soldiers that vivifies their dignity rather than the current Zeitgeist 
that encases their vulnerability. I hope for this book to contribute, however modestly, to that 
process.  
 
 
(iii)  Social Realities of Child Soldiering: Circumscribed Action 
 
 Accumulated knowledge about child soldiers arises from a diversity of disciplines. The 
richness that might flow from this diversity, unfortunately, lies fallow. These disciplines and 
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their concomitant literatures often communicate poorly with each other. In terms of the 
development of law, best practices, and policy, the play of various literatures has been uneven. 
Child psychology and trauma studies have exerted considerable influence. So, too, have reports 
published by transnational pressure groups, NGOs, activists, and UN agencies. The 
recommendations of child rights advocates also have proven instrumental.  
 
Other disciplines and their literatures have not resonated with the international legal 
imagination. In fact, the international legal imagination holds contributions from these fields at 
arm‟s length. Thus, these contributions remain untapped. This gate-keeping occasions a loss, 
insofar as the only way to eradicate child soldiering and promote genuine post-conflict 
reconciliation is to understand the phenomenon as multidimensionally as possible. Examples of 
undervalued contributions include ethnographic participant observation, anthropological studies, 
qualitative research, survey data, and feminist theory. Another is adolescent developmental 
neurobiology, which focuses on the social category of adolescents as distinct from young 
children. This book canvasses these literatures so as to integrate them more robustly into 
conversations about child soldiering. In this regard, this book is both synthetic and creative. It 
aims to revisit the epistemology of child soldiering. It intends to develop a less didactic and more 
grounded composite.  
  
Although not monolithic, these literatures tend to perceive child soldiers neither as 
crushed nor as succumbing, but rather as traversing, surviving, coping, and making what they 
can out of bad circumstances not of their own doing. These literatures foreground individuality 
and adaptation, rather than aimless collective subservience. They voice a more dynamic account 
of child soldiers as social navigators interacting with, instead of overwhelmed by, their 
environments – even when those environments involve the most invidious of circumstances.24 
These literatures also tend to place children, adolescents, youth, and adults along a broader 
continuum that is less rigidly stratified by chronological age demarcations.  
  
Presentation of this information is meant to holistically understand child soldiering so as 
to more meaningfully prevent its occurrence. Although the faultless passive victim image may 
serve as an anodyne to distressing and delicate conversations about militarized youth, the 
international legal imagination needs to do better. Rote deontological denunciation can only take 
us so far. Within transnational discourse, the seemingly inevitable obverse to the innocence of 
the children is the iniquity of the adult commanders of rogue armed groups. Although serving 
rhetorical purposes, presenting these commanders as crazed demented evildoers also obscures 
the reasons why they recruit children in fighting forces. Perhaps these reasons are more 
conventional and strategic, and less visceral, than the portrayal diffused by the international legal 
imagination. In any event, unraveling these reasons would help clarify the sources of child 
soldiering. Such clarification is necessary for the success of dissuasive efforts and the effective 
sanction of adult commanders.  
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What might these various literatures teach us? Chapters 2 and 3 of this book tackle this 
question. At this early juncture, nevertheless, it might be opportune to anticipatorily highlight – 
albeit briskly – some central elements.  
 
 Young children certainly are associated with armed forces or armed groups. In some 
instances, many young children may be forcibly recruited and, in fact, may fight. Most child 
soldiers, however, are not young children. Most are adolescents – often older adolescents aged 
fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. Overall, the young, pre-pubescent child is simply not indicative of 
the norm. Proportionally, the average child soldier is a teenager. The marketing and advertising 
work of charity organizations, however, still inclines toward underscoring the tender age of child 
soldiers. One visual, for example, involves the surrealistic juxtaposition of bullets in what looks 
like a Crayola crayon box.
25
 Although certainly eye-catching and well-intended, this approach 
may neither resonate with nor strike at the heart of the problem of child soldiering.  
 
 In light of the centrality of adolescents to the phenomenon of child soldiering, is it not 
apposite to consider adolescent developmental psychology? This burgeoning field, which 
increasingly is turning to sophisticated neuroscientific and neurobiological methods, 
demonstrates that adolescents typically are more susceptible than adults to outside or peer 
influence. In comparison to adults, adolescents are more represented in reckless behavior. 
Moreover, they: have a gauzier ability to foresee the future; are more impulsive, impetuous, and 
risk-taking; and have more transitory personalities. Adolescents trust more readily and their trust 
can be easily misplaced. But neither is the adolescent brain child-like nor pre-logical. On many 
key metrics, in fact, available research indicates that older adolescents are much more like adults 
than children. Instead of pursuing rigid child/adult binaries, then, perhaps it would make sense 
for law and policy to engage with interstitial developmental categories.  
   
Persons under the age of eighteen associated with armed forces or armed groups largely 
get there in one of three ways: (1) they are abducted or conscripted through force or serious 
threats; (2) they present themselves, whether independently or through recruitment programs and 
become enlisted/enrolled; or (3) they are born into forces or groups. The first two paths, which 
are the most common, are not always capable of firm demarcation. However, they are 
distinguishable and, moreover, should be distinguished.  
  
Readers may find it surprising, but most child soldiers are neither abducted nor forcibly 
recruited. The international legal imagination, nevertheless, heavily emphasizes this path to 
militarization. Doing so exposes this horrific aspect of the phenomenon of child soldiering. This 
emphasis, however, also leads to the undertheorization and underexploration of youth 
volunteerism. The international legal imagination cannot just wish away the fact that significant 
numbers of children join armed forces or armed groups in the absence of evident coercion and, in 
fact, exercise some – and at times considerable – initiative in this regard. Even within the most 
maleficent of conflicts, children come forward and present themselves for service. 
 
In response, the international legal imagination predetermines that no child has the 
capacity to volunteer or to consent to serve – whether innately or because of nightmarish 
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circumstances, or both. Volunteering is presented as an illusion.
26
 The international legal 
imagination is particularly skeptical of armed groups and, in their case, flatly views juvenile 
volunteerism as an impossibility or absurdity. For all intents and purposes, then, enlistment of 
volunteers becomes no different than abduction.  
  
The international legal imagination is remiss to neglect the prevalence and relevance of 
children volunteering for military service. To be sure, cases arise where determinations of 
volunteerism would be specious. Children may be offered up – like chattel – by family members 
or local leaders. They may be tricked into joining. They may come forward to serve as a cook, 
only to be given an automatic weapon and placed on the front lines. Some children may rashly 
present themselves for service because of excessive impulsivity.
27
 That said, as Chapter 3 will 
show, many children, notably older adolescents, come forward intentionally to join armed forces 
or groups. Environmental factors and situational constraints – which include poverty, insecurity, 
lack of education, socialization into violence, and broken families – certainly inform their 
decisions to enlist. This book argues that children‟s engagement with these factors can be more 
usefully understood as interactive and negotiated processes of negative push and affirmative pull.  
 
In joining armed forces or groups, children may simply be pursuing paths of economic 
advancement, inclusion in occupational networks, pursuit of political or ideological reform, and 
professional development. Children – particularly, older adolescents – are not invariably lost on 
these paths. They traverse and cross them as best they can. However disturbing to outsiders, this 
may mean joining armed forces or armed groups. Moreover, at times child recruits deceive their 
parents and other commanders. They conceal their age, travel great distances, and persevere 
tenaciously in their quest to associate with armed forces or groups. They may join despite 
community and family exhortations to the contrary. These children, too, count as child soldiers. 
Although armed groups may seek to undermine legitimate governments through macabre 
methods, they may also serve as engines of protest against illegitimate governments, state 
authoritarianism, and kleptocratic dictatorship. 
 
What child soldiers actually say about their experiences may contrast with how 
international observers broadcast those experiences. In interviews, for example, former child 
soldiers often describe themselves as having volunteered for service. Some interviewers respond 
by discounting all such statements. They thereby massage complex data to fit a simple pre-
existing theory. P.W. Singer – whose work on child soldiers has received considerable attention 
– finds the notion of voluntary recruitment “misleading,” in part because children are “of an age 
at which they are not capable of making mature decisions.”28 Helping hands may prefer to 
believe that child soldiers are ignorant of the absence of choice in their lives and lack the 
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cognitive capacity for discernment. This strategy, however well-intentioned, may demean by 
unduly underscoring gullibility. This strategy, moreover, depletes the informational record and 
leads to misguided recommendations. It risks presenting youth inanimately as objects of study 
rather than vibrantly as sources of information. Although assertions of volunteer service made by 
child soldiers should not be immunized from contextual analysis, I believe it is wrong summarily 
to dismiss them. Young people may understand volunteerism within the context of their lives and 
apply it fairly to themselves.  
 
Dismissing what adolescents have to say owing to their putative jejunity contrasts sharply 
with assumptions of juvenile capacity and autonomy that animate other areas of law and policy. 
For example, when it comes to bioethical debates regarding consent to medical treatment and 
access to reproductive rights and technologies, adolescents tend to be presumed competent. 
International human rights law highlights that adolescents can exercise rights of freedom of 
association and expression. So, too, does international family law. This book argues that 
protective policies predicated upon children being constructed as enfeebled before and during 
conflict may counterproductively result in children persistently being treated as enfeebled after 
conflict. I remain skeptical that atrophied delineations of capacity, and the notion that 
adolescents categorically require infantilizing rules to protect them, actually promote the 
aspiration to engage them as full members of society. Moreover, many persons initially recruited 
as children age into adulthood during conflict or before they feasibly can enroll in post-conflict 
programming. In these instances, infantilizing aspects may become perceived both by them and 
the community as particularly ill-fitting.  
 
Once associated with armed forces or groups, what do children actually do? How are they 
used? Children rotate among various roles, which include combat, auxiliary support, or 
accompanying forces as sex slaves or compelled conjugal partners.
29
 These roles expose them to 
great danger. In contradistinction to often graphic media representations, significant numbers of 
children neither fight nor carry weapons.
30
 Even fewer become implicated in the systematic 
perpetration of acts of atrocity that potentially might fall within the scope of extraordinary 
international crimes (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) proscribed by 
international criminal law.  
 
 The dominant explanatory account is that those child soldiers who commit extraordinary 
international crimes are forced by commanders and, hence, operate under extreme duress; they 
are incapacitated by compelled ingestion of narcotics and alcohol; they are brainwashed and 
resocialized by the endemic violence that envelops them; and they are plagued with fears of 
brutal punishment. Hence, moral responsibility should be excused, even for grievous acts of 
violence. Excuse begets forgiveness which, arguendo, establishes a firm footing for the child 
soldier‟s reintegration.  
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This dominant account explains many acts of atrocity perpetrated by persons under the 
age of eighteen. Despite their frequency, however, these cases cannot be universalized. The 
international legal imagination tends, once again, to wish away the fact that not all child soldiers 
materially implicated in acts of atrocity actually conform to this explanatory account. In this 
regard, the international legal imagination undertheorizes the challenge at hand, perhaps selfishly 
insofar as:  
 
[T]he fact that children are capable of violence clearly falls outside 
entrenched modernist formulations of childhood. Children who behave 
violently – who rape, murder and kill – pose a conundrum because they 
dismantle the idea of the romantic innocence and vulnerability of 
childhood.
31
 
  
Considerable heterogeneity arises among child soldiers with regard to their relationship 
to violence that, in turn, underscores the ongoing salience of disposition, choice, and residual 
discretion to exceed or subvert command authority. Some child soldiers lie to and manipulate 
commanders to avoid killing. Others refuse to inflict gross human rights abuses upon third-party 
civilians or combatants. Other child soldiers, however, torture, rape, and kill to navigate volatile 
militarized hierarchies. Some do so gratuitously or to pursue lucre.   
 
Accordingly, afflicted communities may perceive child soldiers in a considerably more 
individuated fashion. They may see them as actual persons known to them rather than as 
anonymously fungible “beasts of no nation.”32 These details matter. Furthermore, regardless of 
why they did it and the circumstances thereof, the fact remains that the acts of child soldiers do 
impose staggering consequences upon the lives of others, including children.
33
 
 
Given the distortions and omissions engendered by the faultless passive victim lens (as 
well as the occlusions triggered by other currently circulated images), is there another way to talk 
about child soldiers that reflects the complexities of their experiences?  
 
This book proposes to approach individual child soldiers through a model of 
circumscribed action. A circumscribed actor has the ability to act, the ability not to act, and the 
ability to do otherwise than what he or she actually has done. The effective range of these 
abilities, however, is delimited, bounded, and confined. Yet, the abilities themselves are neither 
evanescent nor ephemeral. Circumscribed actors exercise some discretion in navigating and 
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mediating the constraints around them. Circumscribed actors dispose of an enclosed space which 
is theirs – the acreage of which varies according to an oscillating admixture of disposition and 
situation – in which they exercise a margin of volition. Within this space, they make short-term 
decisions. Circumscribed actors scale social environments they did not create. Although acted 
upon, they also act upon others. Oppression, after all, does not axiomatically void the 
oppressed‟s capacity for decision-making. Nor is it normatively desirable as a matter of 
policymaking to adopt such an arthritic and atrophied view of the oppressed.  
 
Circumscribed action is not a metaphor, nor a photograph, nor an ideal-type, nor an 
image whose reification is sought and to which all prima facie categorized individuals are to 
conform. Rather, circumscribed action is presented as a spectrum or continuum that embraces the 
inherent diversity among the individuals aligned along its axis.
34
 Presenting circumscribed action 
as a spectrum, instead of a singular category, facilitates procedural inquiry regarding the specific 
histories and experiences of these individuals. 
 
When law internalizes the chronological watershed of the age of eighteen, and turns to it 
to contrast the capable adult from the incapable child, law creates an exigent situation for young 
adults. After all, neuroscience teaches us that, as a matter of age, cognitive functions continue to 
develop well into the mid-twenties. When the law draws bright-lines, outsiders may become 
excessively exposed to the very vicissitudes from which law aims to insulate insiders. Abusive 
commanders may simply shift their focus from older children to young adults. In the end, law 
may simultaneously protect too much and too little. Accordingly, a turn a model of 
circumscribed action would abandon the current predilection for two oppositional polarities – 
that is, child or adult – and thereby relieve younger adults from the weight of excessive hardship 
and older children from the straightjacket of excessive infantilization.  
 
 
(iv)  An Emergent Legal Fiction and its Effects  
 
Where does the faultless passive victim image intend to shift international law and 
policy?  
 
For starters, toward eighteen as the threshold age of permissible military service. This 
book argues that attainment of this goal would be facilitated were its pursuit to be paired with a 
less judgmental and more tempered portrayal of those persons intended for protective coverage. 
Another intended shift involves the vitiation of the legal relevance of distinctions among kinds of 
recruitment or use and, correspondingly, to annul the possibility that any child ever can volunteer 
to serve or to perform functions within armed forces or groups.  
 
Considerable momentum also is afoot to exclude children (including child soldiers), 
whether de jure or de facto, from the jurisdiction of international or internationalized courts and 
tribunals that adjudge extraordinary atrocity crimes. Although prosecuting child soldiers for such 
crimes is certainly not unlawful, such prosecutions, as Chapter 4 elaborates, increasingly are seen 
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as inappropriate and, even, illegitimate. The push for international institutions to abjure criminal 
trials for child soldiers implicated in acts of atrocity conceptually seeps into the national and 
local court systems of post-conflict societies. As a result, national criminal prosecutions of 
former child soldiers become discouraged as well.  
 
The faultless passive victim narrative also suffuses post-conflict justice modalities other 
than criminal trials. For example, in the case of truth-seeking and reconciliation mechanisms, 
ascendant best practices advise that children can only participate therein voluntarily as witnesses 
or victims.
35
 These best practices also advocate that all child participants – including children 
formerly associated with armed forces or groups – be treated equally as victims or witnesses.36 In 
other words, children are not to be distinguished inter se in terms of their individual conduct. 
Nor, apparently, are child soldiers to be distinguished from other children in conflict zones. 
Individual participation in acts of atrocity is, therefore, not approached through a quid pro quo 
dialogue of forgiveness. The elimination of distinctions among group members helps accord 
legal protection to as many children as possible. Nevertheless, this book cautions against this 
policy preference. Child soldiers can be treated as a generally protected class while distinctions 
among individual class members still remain respected.    
 
The push is to void victim-perpetrator ambiguity in the case of child soldiers. When the 
child inflicts horrors, responsibility passes entirely to the adult abductor, enlister, recruiter, or 
commander. Although abjured for child soldiers, international criminal tribunals are invoked to 
prosecute as war criminals those adults who conscript, enlist, or use children below the age of 
fifteen as active participants in hostilities. Straight 18 aspirations endeavor to expand this 
prohibition to cover all children, that is, all persons younger than eighteen.
37
  
 
The international community has invested considerable resources and energy to prosecute 
a handful of adult militia leaders for unlawful conscription, enlistment, or use of children 
younger than fifteen. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), a hybrid court created 
cooperatively between the UN and the Sierra Leonean government, has issued several 
convictions on such charges. The inaugural trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The 
Hague – involving Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a DRC rebel leader – is proceeding exclusively on 
these charges. The Rome Statute, the multilateral international treaty establishing the ICC, also 
permits victims to participate in the criminal proceedings against an accused. On this note, ICC 
judges have determined the class of persons harmed by child soldiers not to be direct or indirect 
victims of Lubanga‟s alleged conduct and, thus, have denied applications brought by class 
members to participate in the criminal proceedings against him.  
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Although the faultless passive victim image reflects the experiences of many child 
soldiers, I argue – borrowing a term of art from legal philosopher Lon Fuller – that its 
transposition into law spins a legal fiction.
38
According to Fuller, a fiction “is neither a truthful 
statement, nor a lie, nor an erroneous conclusion.”39 Fuller identifies many kinds of legal 
fictions. What I call the legal fiction of faultless passive victimhood most closely approximates 
the category of neglective or abstractive fictions.
40
 For Fuller, neglective fictions constitute the 
“most obvious example of the process by which our minds simplify reality.”41  
 
Legal fictions are neither intrinsically malignant nor intrinsically benign. They are 
constructs that serve both ill and good. In the case of child soldiering, the legal fiction of 
faultless passive victimhood fulfills a number of valuable purposes. Because it offers a 
disambiguated and pointed message, it helps marshal resources and co-ordinate condemnation. 
Many of the reforms the fiction has impressed upon the architecture of law, policy, and best 
practices are salutary.  
 
Along with a variety of gains, however, indulging this legal fiction also produces 
operational shortcomings. 
 
One example, elaborated upon in Chapter 5, involves the prosecution of adult recruiters 
and users of child soldiers. These prosecutions help condemn child soldiering. They go some 
modest way to draw down the incidence of this practice. International lawyers and policymakers, 
however, have an affinity to exaggerate the deterrent value of these prosecutions. Such 
bullishness is unwise. It distracts from the need to search well beyond the architecture of the 
courtroom and jailhouse in order to meaningfully dissuade and, ultimately, end child soldiering. 
When international criminal law fixates on the adult recruiter or user, it flits past the multiple 
sources of child soldiering – institutional, power politics, commercial, and historical. State 
responsibility for unlawful recruitment of children, along with other forms of collective sanction, 
therefore remains undertheorized and underdeveloped. This book hopes to encourage deeper 
reflection and more action along these lines. As part of their goal to accentuate the moral 
culpability of adult recruiters or users, criminal prosecutions amplify how post-traumatic stress 
syndrome debilitates former child soldiers. If convicting perpetrators becomes entwined with 
tropes of youth helplessness, however, the upshot may be incarcerating a handful of adults while 
simultaneously perpetuating gerontocracy by eroding tenets of juvenile autonomy and ability.  
 
Chapter 6 identifies and expounds upon several other externalities supported or generated 
by the faultless passive victim image. Of greatest concern is the sidelining of transitional justice 
from post-conflict initiatives to reintegrate former child soldiers and to reconstruct their 
communities.
42
 The phrase transitional justice designates the range of processes by which 
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societies come to terms with histories of widespread violence, how they reckon with terrible 
human rights abuses, and how people within afflicted constituencies come to live together again. 
Transitional justice is concerned with redress, historical clarification, and reconciliation. 
Processes commonly associated with transitional justice include criminal trials, civil liability (for 
example, private tort actions, restitutionary claims, and public reparations), lustration, 
community service programs, truth and reconciliation commissions, endogenous mechanisms,
43
 
public inquiries, and restorative ceremonies. These processes vary considerably inter se 
regarding how and to what degree they allocate responsibility for acts of atrocity. They 
nevertheless share the pursuit of social repair through a framework that recognizes the pain that 
these acts have wrought. These institutions also share the belief that there can be no durable 
stability if injustices and human rights abuses are left unaddressed. This does not necessarily 
mean that perpetrators have to confess or atone. Many endogenous ceremonies, for example, do 
not contemplate such methods, preferring instead to address past wrongs through future-oriented 
work and cultivation of relationships.   
 
The international legal imagination‟s propensity is to generically ease a potential three-
dimensional status of child soldiers as perpetrators, witnesses, and victims into a two-
dimensional portrayal of child soldiers as victims and witnesses alone. This constriction, 
however, engenders some opportunity costs. In response, this book advances the normative claim 
that transitional justice initiatives other than criminal trials, in particular truth commissions and 
endogenous mechanisms, can help facilitate reintegration and reconciliation in cases of child 
soldiers implicated in acts of atrocity. Chapter 6, which explores this claim in depth, directs 
specific attention toward restorative justice approaches.  
 
I do not call for former child soldiers to be criminally prosecuted for suspected violations 
of international criminal law before international institutions and, if found guilty, to be punished 
through incarceration. Nor do I recommend prosecutions or imprisonment at the national level. 
My reservations extend even more emphatically to proceedings before military commissions or 
tribunals, which are particularly susceptible to procedural irregularities and political vagaries. 
The outrageous situation faced at Guantánamo Bay by Omar Khadr, a Canadian child soldier 
who, as a minor, had associated with al-Qaeda, is illustrative.
44
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As a matter of outcome, then, I concur in the international legal imagination‟s push to 
discard criminal trials for child soldiers. I disagree, however, when it comes to why. My 
skepticism regarding criminal trials for child soldiers implicated in acts of atrocity flows from 
my broader circumspection regarding the ability of the atrocity trial to attain its principally 
avowed penological goals, especially in the case of lower-level cadres, regardless of the age of 
the accused.
45
 These goals include retribution, deterrence, and expressivism. Penological goals of 
rehabilitation and reintegration, which should be particularly salient in the context of juveniles, 
do not centrally figure among international criminal law‟s aspirations. The fact that child soldiers 
do not serve as conflict entrepreneurs or political leaders dulls the benefits of incapacitating 
them. Former child soldiers and those persons harmed by their conduct require restoration, which 
sequestered incarceration does not provide.  
 
To recap, this book does not turn to criminal law as a regulatory solution. Why, then, 
does it devote considerable space to review the interface of the international legal imagination 
with the question of the potential criminal culpability of child soldiers? Why be concerned with 
assessing how, and for which reasons, conventional wisdom has come to eschew criminal trials 
for child soldiers enmeshed in the commission of acts of atrocity? The answer lies in the fact that 
what the international legal imagination says, recommends, and exhorts ultimately bears heavily 
upon the reconstructive journeys of inter- and post-conflict societies. Transnational interventions 
matter. Although excluding child soldiers from international and national criminal trials may 
well be appropriate as a policy result, the current rationales for so doing, and the forces that 
propel those rationales, have come to overshoot their mark. Fear that child soldiers may become 
subject to punitive criminal trials has induced a crudely fulsome protectionism that has come to 
insulate child soldiers from accountability processes generally, regardless of the goals or 
potentials of those processes. This protectionism needlessly cocoons child soldiers from the 
tough questions that societies must reckon with in order to come to terms with mass violence. 
The solution, then, is not for international criminal law to recognize the criminal culpability of 
children but, instead, for transnational discourse to develop a more fine-grained approach to 
post-conflict accountability. I have elsewhere urged the adoption of more fine-grained 
approaches to victimization and perpetration as a general matter.
46
 Hence, the proposals made in 
this book dovetail with my overarching vision of what post-conflict justice ideally ought to look 
like.  
 
As Chapter 6 demonstrates, afflicted communities want their children back home. They 
welcome the return of former child soldiers. Transnationally motored discourses of forgiveness 
without reciprocal obligation may appear, at first blush, to mesh with local sentiments of 
forgiveness without reciprocal obligation. Impulses arise in afflicted communities to accept 
excuse – namely constraint enhanced by youth – in the case of the antecedent violent acts of 
child soldier returnees.  
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Transnational discourse, however, overestimates the uniformity and flexibility of 
community sentiment. A careful mining of the evidentiary record reveals that communities care 
about conduct during conflict, that is, why and how did the child join fighting forces and, once 
there, what did he or she do. Communities do not take all child soldier returnees to be fungible 
moral equals and to require identical approaches to reintegration. It is unclear whether 
community members unambivalently accept that the cognizability of their injuries should hew so 
tightly to the age of the perpetrator. The fact that community members demonstrate variable and 
volatile sentiments, ranging from joy to cordiality to antipathy, is understandable. In fact, it 
should be obvious. Regardless of who perpetrated it and why, mass atrocity invariably engenders 
a broad gamut of raw emotions among survivors and targeted populations. To pretend otherwise 
is foolhardy. To base policy on such pretension is quixotic.   
 
Unsurprisingly, certain subgroups of former child soldiers face reintegration hurdles. 
Their home communities simply do not accept the suitability of the collectivized faultless 
passive victim narrative as applied to them as individuals. One such subgroup is child soldiers 
who have served for long periods of times with armed forces or groups. Another subgroup 
involves child soldiers suspected of having committed atrocities or believed to have been 
affiliated with units that inflicted atrocities. These subgroups are at risk for marginalization and a 
recrudescence of militarized life, crime, and violence.  
 
The legal fiction, therefore, neither represents nor reaches a relevant number of child 
soldier returnees, for whom reinsertion is far from seamless or self-evident. For this subgroup, 
unconditional excuse does not resonate within afflicted communities. Instead, consideration 
might be given to exploring processes of forgiveness predicated upon mutual and reciprocal 
obligation among returnees and the community. Reintegration cannot always be assumed. The 
violence may be too much.  
 
Collaterally, transitional justice measures also may relieve the child soldier‟s sense of 
injustice. The child soldier may justifiably harbor resentment toward the community that idled 
while forcible recruitment ensnared its youth. Transitional justice measures may enable the child 
soldier to tell what happened to him or her. And to identify or learn who in the community may 
have abetted unscrupulous warlords. Transitional justice processes create a venue to discuss 
much more than accountability and responsibility. They also may authenticate stories of 
resistance to atrocity and contestation to cruel orders.
47
 In this regard, transitional justice 
processes may come to benefit not only subgroups of child soldiers implicated in atrocity, but all 
child soldiers as well.  
  
In my work with adult atrocity perpetrators I have come to experience that many – 
perhaps self-servingly – view themselves as victims or tools who simply ended up on the losing 
side of circumstance. The international legal imagination gives short shrift to their 
representations of subservience and victimhood. Adults, after all, are not legally excused from 
choices, often exercised in times of chaos, to join armed forces or groups that commit atrocity. 
Their responsibility is not evacuated. Many adults are compulsorily conscripted, as well, yet this 
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does not ab initio absolve them from the consequences of their conduct. Many adult soldiers are 
little older than eighteen and live in strikingly similar situations to child soldiers. They are thus 
contemporaries. Can so much differentiation realistically hinge upon a simple matter of 
chronological age? Jo Boyden and Joanna de Berry remain unconvinced:  
 
[C]hildren and adolescents can be very active in defining their own 
allegiances during conflict, as well as their own strategies for coping and 
survival. This implies that the prevailing dichotomy between adult as 
active perpetrator and child as passive victim needs challenging.
48
 
  
According to anthropologist Susan Shepler, writing within the context of Sierra Leone, 
“[c]oming to terms with the participation of child soldiers […] is key to postwar reconciliation 
and peace building.”49 I believe that international law and policy, however, fails to demonstrate 
adroitness or finesse in negotiating this quandary. One way to redress this blind spot is to trim 
the emphasis on criminal law binaries of guilt or innocence, corruption or purity, victim or 
perpetrator, and adult or child. 
 
Adopting a baseline of circumscribed action might open the space necessary to effect 
meaningful conceptual shifts and, thereby, synergistically liaise with the work of those observers 
who believe that transitional justice matters for child soldiers.
50
 For example, international 
lawyer Cécile Aptel recognizes the value of non-penal proceedings in acknowledging children‟s 
wrongdoing and diminishing stigma. She suggests that “more thinking is required concerning the 
liability of children who have participated in the commission of crimes.” 51 This book hopes to 
respond to this need and inspire a framework for reform. Meaningful change cannot occur, 
however, until the presumptive imagery recedes from from the tautness of passive victimhood 
and embraces something more dynamic, such as circumscribed action.
52
 Efforts to engage with 
transitional justice will remain superficial unless liberated from the strictures of victimhood 
discourse. This discourse, and its correlative imagery, is simply too tendentious.  
 
                                                 
48
 Boyden & de Berry, supra note 16, at xv.  
49
 Susan Shepler, The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in Sierra 
Leone, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 197, 198 (2005).  
50
 CHILDREN AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 13, at x-xi, 65; CHILDREN AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: TRUTH-
TELLING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION Annex (Key Operational Principles) (UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre and Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School, Sharanjeet Parmar, Mindy Jane Roseman, 
Saudamini Siegrist & Theo Sowa eds., 2010) [hereinafter CHILDREN AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]. 
51
 Cécile Aptel, International Criminal Justice and Child Protection, in CHILDREN AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 50, at 67, 107-111.  
52
 For example, Human Rights Watch‟s suggestion that former child soldiers “participat[e] in restorative justice 
processes to help the child acknowledge their actions and gain reacceptance by the community” is hampered by the 
very foundational images Human Rights Watch disseminates about children as choicelessly coerced into fighting 
and unthinkingly committing violent acts. Human Rights Watch, COERCION AND INTIMIDATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
TO PARTICIPATE IN VIOLENCE 15 (2008). The IDDRS encourages more robust connections between transitional 
justice and DDR programming – including for child soldiers, for whom restorative mechanisms notably are 
discussed. Notwithstanding their innovative nature, the IDDRS recommendations also remained cabined by the 
IDDRS‟s depiction that “[f]ormer child soldiers are victims of criminal policies for which adults are responsible.” 
IDDRS, supra note 37, at §5.30, p. 9.  
33 
 
In short, then, this book advises that the legal fiction of faultless passive victimhood 
should be dismantled and, therewith, its controlling effects deflated.  
 
Assuredly, as is the case with any reformative process, renewal may produce fresh 
concerns. In reimagining the child soldier, and recommending policy shifts keyed thereto, this 
book is anticipatorily mindful of three sets of concerns: pragmatics (are the suggested reforms 
affordable or realistic?), fear (is this book opening the door to harsh punishment for child 
soldiers, thereby leaving them worse off?), and overreach (instead of circumscribed action, why 
not just a rebuttable presumption of victimhood?). Various sections of the book address these 
concerns. Chapter 7 takes on the trickiest one, namely, fears that child soldiers become subject to 
harsh treatment and  renewed abuse.  
 
In the end, I remain persuaded that the proposals in this book are worthwhile. They also 
convey broader pedagogic value. In this regard, Chapter 7 adumbrates connections between 
reimagining child soldiers, on the one hand, and three cognate challenges, on the other. These 
challenges are: reforming domestic justice systems in cases of ordinary common crime 
committed by juveniles, rehabilitating victims of transnational crimes that fall outside the aegis 
of international criminal law (e.g. sex- and drug-trafficking), and revisiting the place of 
international criminal law within the overall framework of post-conflict justice.   
 
  
(v)  Conclusion 
 
It is much easier to express outrage regarding the oxymoron of the child soldier than it is 
to interrogatively theorize the oxymoron so as to enhance preventative and remedial policies. It 
is considerably easier to pre-judge ex ante that children and adolescents bear no responsibility for 
the situations they find themselves in and what they interstitially do within those situations than 
to examine ex post why, exactly, they militarize and then why, exactly, some among them 
become involved in committing terrible crimes. The easier path that assuages transnational 
sensibilities, however, is not necessarily the best path to protect children or safeguard the public. 
Policy based on the convenient answer may simply be poor policy.    
